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COMMENT
THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
STUDENT-ATHLETES AND COLLEGES: AN
ANALYSIS OF A HEIGHTENED DUTY OF
CARE FOR THE INJURIES OF
STUDENT-ATHLETES
I. INTRODUCTION
Intercollegiate sports today have generated a multi-million dollar en-
tertainment industry.' For example, the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA)2 is currently in a seven-year, $1 billion contract
with CBS, the broadcaster of the NCAA Men's Basketball Tourna-
ment.3 The vast commercial nature of major college athletics today is
undeniable.4 These programs produce tremendous economic and non-
economic benefits for colleges and universities.
While this increased financial interest in college athletics is not a re-
cent phenomenon, debate continues to grow over what is "due" col-
lege-athletes who help generate substantial revenue for major college
athletic departments. Student-athletes continue to receive the tradi-
tional kinds of benefits from universities, namely an environment in
which to attain a degree. The NCAA has maintained its principle of
1. For example, the University of Michigan, Illinois, Duke, and Seton Hall each received
about $1.23 million for their participation in the 1989 NCAA Men's Basketball Championship
Tournament. Cathy J. Jones, College Athletes: Illness or Injury and the Decision to Return to
Play, 40 BuFF. L. Pv. 113, 154 (1992).
2. The NCAA is composed of almost 1000 member institutions. Member schools are di-
vided into three main legislative and competitive divisions, depending on the size of the school
and the expansiveness of the athletic program. The NCAA's purpose is to create policy re-
garding intercollegiate athletics. It supervises conduct and the needs of its member institu-
tions, enforces safety, administrative, athletic, and educational guidelines affecting college
athletics. See generally GEORGE W. SCHuBERT ET AL., SPORTS LAW (1986) (discussing the
role of the NCAA in the regulation of intercollegiate athletics).
3. Jones, supra note 1, at 154.
4. In reality, only a select group of college athletic departments generate the tremendous
levels of revenues each year. Most college athletic programs do not make a profit. MuRRAy
SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS, INC.: TiE ATHLETIc DEPARTMENT VS. THE UNVERsnTY 2
(1990).
5. RONALD SmrrH, SPORTS AND FREEDOM: THE RISE OF Bi-TiME COLLEGE ATmwncs
26 (1988) (discussing the first crew competition held in New Haven, CT between Harvard and
Yale).
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amateurism-in other words, student-athletes are to be motivated pri-
marily by education.6 The NCAA persists in the belief that an athlete's
participation in college athletics is rewarded with an education, rather
than with money.7
However, critics and commentators believe that the nature of the col-
lege athletic system must be re-evaluated.8 Fundamental questions
about what colleges "owe" to revenue-producing student-athletes con-
tinue to be raised. Should these athletes receive a portion of that reve-
nue? Generally, what legal duties do colleges owe student-athletes?
It has been proposed that the concept of amateurism be replaced by
treating the college and student-athlete relationship as one of employer-
employee.9 While the courts have generally refused such an arrange-
ment,10 they have recognized a limited duty of care owed by colleges to
students in general." This limited duty, however, is not enough. There
is growing legal and scholarly support for the idea of student-athletes
being protected by a "heightened" duty of care.' 2
This comment explores the special relationship between colleges and
student-athletes. Part II discusses the limited nature of the duty of care
owed to private students1 3 by colleges. Part Ill discusses the duty of care
owed to student-athletes by colleges and argues that a "special relation-
ship" characterized by mutual dependence exists between the two. Fi-
nally, Part IV highlights some recents cases which support the notion
6. See NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETics AssoCIAION, 1993-94 NCAA MANUAL § 2.4,
2.7, 14.01.1.
7. See Shannon Brownlee & Nancy S. Linnon, The Myth of the Student-Athlete, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 8, 1990, at 50.
8. SPERBER, supra note 4, at 345-53. Robert Davis, Academics and Athletics on a Colli-
sion Course, 66 N.D. L. REv. 239, 243 (1990). Mr. Davis states that real reform in college
athletics demands changes in the way in which colleges view the role of athletics in higher
education and the removal of the financial incentive to win.
9. SPERBER, supra note 4, at 1.
10. See State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 314 P.2d 288, 290
(Col. 1957); Rensing v. Ind. State Univ., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. 1983); Coleman v. vest-
ern Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
11. See Timothy Davis, Examining Educational Malpractice Jurisprudence: Should a
Cause of Action Be Created for Student-Athletes?, 69 DENY. U. L. REv. 57, 86 (1992) (discuss-
ing the courts' recognition of tort "special relationships" as a basis for a duty on colleges to
protect students).
12. See infra part IV.A. See also Edward H. Whang, Necessary Roughness: Imposing a
Heightened Duty of Care on Colleges For Injuries of Student-Athletes, 2 SPORTS LAW. J. 25
(1995).
13. This comment will distinuish "private students" from "student-athletes." "Private stu-
dents" means those students who are not participants in intercollegiate athletics.
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that a "heightened" duty of care should exist for the foreseeable injuries
of student-athletes.
II. DUTY OF CARE OWED TO PRIVATE STUDENTS By COLLEGES
Generally, no duty recognized by law exists absent a special circum-
stance.14 While exceptions exist, courts have not been inclined to find
colleges liable for injuries to students while at college.' 5 In effect, uni-
versities have been absolved from liability to private students when the
courts have found no special circumstances. Since the demise of the in
loco parentis doctrine within the college setting,16 many courts have pre-
sumed that students are mature adults capable of independently regulat-
ing their own lives and have refused to police college students.' 7
Student-plaintiffs claiming that colleges should be legally responsible
for their injuries suffered during college most often file suits based on
negligence.' 8 A negligence claim is a tort action, which is a theory of law
that allows compensation for individuals who have sustained injuries due
to the harmful conduct of another.' 9 Four elements compose a tradi-
tional negligence cause of action: (1) a duty, or obligation, recognized
by law, requiring the defendant actor to conform to a certain standard of
conduct; (2) a breach of the duty, or a failure on the defendant actor's
part to conform to that standard; (3) a reasonably close causal connec-
tion between the injuries and the breach; and (4) an injury resulting from
that breach.20 A legally recognized "duty," therefore, is the threshold
14. Theodore C. Stamatakos, Note, The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis, Tort Liability and
the Student-College Relationship, 65 IND. L.J. 471, 472 (1990).
15. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 141 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446
U.S. 909 (1980) (rejecting student-plaintiff's claim that alcohol at a school-related event im-
posed a duty upon the college to protect the student); Mortiboys v. St. Michael's College, 478
F.d 196 (2nd Cir. 1973) (refusing to impose liability on a college because college employees
were unaware of dangerous condition on school property that led to student's injuries).
16. See infra part II.A.1.
17. See Hegel v. Langsam, 273 N.E.2d 351 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971) (refusing to hold a col-
lege liable for lack of monitoring the non-academic activities of its students); Beach v. Univer-
sity of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) (reasoning that the university's purpose is to educate,
not "baby sit" students).
18. See Tia Miyamoto, Liability of Colleges and Universities for Injuries During Extracur-
ricular Activities, 15 J.C. & U.L. 149, 150 (1988).
19. Bernard J. Colan, Risk Management Gives Those Who Treat Athletes Sporting Chance
Against Litigation, ADVANCE, Aug. 15, 1994.
20. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30,164-65
(5th ed. 1984).
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element in a negligence claim.21 Duty is essentially a policy question.2
Because duty has its foundation in policy concerns, the analysis of legal
duty changes with the consideration of shifting social norms.23 Thus, the
changing environment caused by big-money intercollegiate athletics
must be considered in re-assessing the legal duties owed by colleges to
student-athletes.
A. Tort Liability or Duty of Colleges to Private Students
Despite this limited duty of care owed to students by colleges, stu-
dent-plaintiffs can recover for injuries suffered while at college uader
several theories. The first theory claims that colleges owe a duty to pro-
tect students based on the in loco parentis doctrine, meaning "in the
place of the parent." 24 The second theory is that colleges owe a duty of
care to students based on a landowner-invitee relationship between col-
leges and students. The last argument used by student-plaintiffs declares
that colleges owe a duty of care because of the "special relationship"
between universitites and students.
1. In Loco Parentis Doctrine
The common law doctrine of in loco parentis recognizes that the rela-
tionship between a student and a school is unique and special.2s Under
this doctrine, school authorities stand "in place of the parents" and have
the authority to create regulations they consider necessary under the law
regarding student's mental training, moral and physical discipline, and
general student welfare.26
The in loco parentis doctrine evolved during the 1800s into a legal
relationship defined by the dominant social and judicial views of the
time.27 College students were generally seen at that time as children re-
quiring the protection of the college.28 Courts generally accepted and
21. Id.
22. "Duty is not sancrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection."
KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at 358.
23. Id. at 359.
24. BLAcK'S LAWv DiCrIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990).
25. See, e.g., Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 102 So. 637 (Fla. 1924).
26. Id. at 640.
27. See William M. Beaney, Students, Higher Education and the Law, 45 DENV. LJ. 511,
513-514 (1968) (declaring that courts defined legal rights between colleges and students based
on the "prevailing societal and judicial attitudes of the era").
28. See James J. Szablewicz & Annette Gibbs, Colleges' Increasing Exposure to Liability:
The New In Loco Parentis, 16 J.L. & EDuc. 453, 454 (1987).
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deferred to a colleges's paternalistic authority over students and adopted
a "hands-off" policy regarding decisions of colleges in both academic and
non-academic matters.29
Yet, after the case of Brown v. Board of Education3 ° in the 1950s,
courts began to question the application of the in loco parentis doctrine
within the context of the college setting.31 During the 1960s, the in loco
parentis doctrine continued to lose its force within the framework of the
college setting. Increased freedom for students on college campuses in
response to social and political changes led to changed attitudes about
the student-college relationship. Courts began to recognize greater indi-
vidual rights of students. 32 Although some individuals wish to re-assess
the modern-day applicability of the in loco parentis doctrine in light of
increased reckless behavior on college campuses,33 courts today continue
to view this doctrine as ineffective for students alleging liability at the
college level. 34
2. Landowner-Invitee Liability
In comparison to the in loco parentis doctrine, students have been
more successful in holding colleges liable for injuries occurring on-cam-
pus based on the landowner-invitee relationship between colleges and
students.35 Courts have legally recognized the duty of colleges to pre-
vent on-campus student injuries because of the "special relationship" of
landowner-invitee between colleges and students.36
Despite this recognition, courts have not been as easily persuaded to
impose liability on colleges for injuries students have suffered off cam-
pus. 37 This disparity can be explained by focusing on the location of the
29. Beaney, supra note 27, at 514.
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. See e.g., Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463,470 n.11 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1967).
32. See Spring Walton, In Loco Parentis for the 1990's: New Liabilities, 19 Omo N.U.L.
REv. 247, 253 (1992).
33. See Philip M. Hirshberg, The College's Emerging Duty to Supervise Students: In Loco
Parentis in the 1990s, 46 WAsH. U.J. URE. & CoNmMP. L. 189 (1994).
34. See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 909
(1980) (the court recognition of greater student rights foreclosed the application of in loco
parentis as a basis for college liability).
35. See Bearman v. University of Notre Dame, 453 N.E.2d 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983);
Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 685 P.2d 1193 (Cal. 1984) (a student's
status as invitee and college's status as possessor of premises created a special relationship to
impose a duty on the college to protect students).
36. See supra note 11.
37. Miyamoto, supra note 18.
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student injury. In an on-campus injury case, a student-plaintiff can
clearly argue that the institution is a landowner and, therefore, possesses
a duty of care to that student-plaintiff.38 But an injury occurring off cam-
pus creates problems for a student-plaintiff, where the school is not
clearly defined as a landowner under the law. Critics have declared that
college liability in such a situation should not turn on whether the injury
occurred on or off campus.39 Furthermore, courts have not implemented
strict liability on colleges for on-campus student injuries. Courts have
held that a duty of care on a college does not automatically exist when a
foreseeable injury has occurred, even if the incident is highly foresee-
able.40 Therefore, the court-imposed duty of care of colleges based on
landowner-invitee relationship is very limited. As a result, student-ath-
letes have little protection from a college under the landowner-invitee
theory should an injury occur during an off-campus athletic contest.
However, student-athletes deserve more protection. A college's duty of
care to student-athletes should not be based solely on whether an injury
occurs on or off campus.
3. The "Special" Relationship of the Student and College
Some student-plaintiffs claim colleges should be held liable for inju-
ries to students because the student and college relationship is "special."
Basic tort principles dictate that no duty of care exists unless "special"
circumstances arise between the plaintiff and defendant.41 The Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts §314A 41 lists special relationships that give rise
to a duty to aid or protect:
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take
reasonable action
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical
harm, and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know
that they are ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be
cared for by others.
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests.
38. Stamatakos, supra note 14, at 486-87.
39. Miyamoto, supra note 18, at 175.
40. See Mortiboys, 478 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1973) (refusing to impose liability on a college
because the college employees were unaware of the dangerous condition on school property
that led to the student's injuries).
41. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) (stating that "the fact that the actor
realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection
does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action").
42. Id. at § 314A.
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(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a
similar duty to members of the public who enter in response to his
invitation.
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes
the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the
other of his normal opportunities for protection is under a similar
duty to the other.
Importantly, the list of special relations specified in Restatement
§314A is not an exclusive list.43 Comment (b) to §314A states that:
The duties stated in this section arise out of special relations be-
tween the parties, which create a special responsibility, and take
the case out of the general rule. The relations listed are not in-
tended to be exclusive, and are not necessarily the only ones in
which a duty of affirmative action for the aid or protection of an-
other may be found.'
The language of the Restatement provides courts the opportunity to rec-
ognize special relationships other than those specifically listed in §314A.
Thus, courts can declare that the student-college relationship itself is a
special one and impose a duty of care on colleges outside the traditional
tort relationship of landowner-invitee.
The courts, however, have been reluctant to characterize the student-
college relationship as "special." 45 This reluctance to impose such a duty
upon colleges is based, in part, on the courts' perceptions discussed ear-
lier - that students are autonomous adults who are fully capable of tak-
ing care of themselves. Courts continue to recognize that colleges are
institutions of higher learning, and are not meant to "insure" student
safety or stand in a "special relationship" with students. Courts have
held the view that colleges are "educational institutions not custodial
[ones]. 46
III. DUTY OF CARE OWED TO STUDENT-ATHLETES BY COLLEGES
As stated earlier, courts have been reluctant to impose a broad duty
of care owed by colleges to private students.47 Student-plaintiffs have
43. Id. at caveat (declaring that the "Institute expresses no opinion as to whether there
may not be other relations which impose a similar duty").
44. Id. at § 314A, cmt.b.
45. For example, courts have refused to impose duty of care requirements on colleges
when students have been injured as a result of underage drinking. See Bradshaw v. Rawlings,
612 F.2d 135, 141 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980); Baldwin v. Zoradi, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 809, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
46. Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 419 (Utah 1986).
47. See supra note 15.
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been unsuccessful in establishing such a duty of care through use of the
in loco parentis doctrine.48 They have had limited success in establishing
a university's duty of care through the landowner-invitee relationship,49
and generally have not been successful in establishing to courts the exist-
ence of a "special relationship" between colleges and students.50
However, when students are also intercollegiate athletes who gener-
ate millions for universities through television contracts and bowl ap-
pearances, shouldn't the courts view the college and student-athlete
relationship differently? Do student-athletes deserve a heightened duty
of care regarding foreseeable injuries during intercollegiate contests
from colleges?
Colleges do owe a heightened duty of care to their student-athletes,
beyond what is owed to private students. This heightened duty of care is
justified because: (1) colleges do not view student-athletes as employ-
ees, while these students generate both economic and non-economic
benefits for colleges; (2) student-athletes are clearly distinct from pri-
vate students; and (3) student-athletes and colleges have a "special rela-
tionship" characterized by mutual dependence.
A. Athletes as Employees of Colleges?
Several commentators have declared that the NCAA should dramati-
cally change the amateur system within which student-athletes currently
participate.5 ' These commentators have stated that treating college ath-
letes as amateurs is inadequate and does not fully protect their rights.12
Some have suggested that student-athletes be paid as employees of col-
legiate athletic programs; in essence, to view athletes as employees of
the college and professionalize college sports.53
Despite these outspoken critics of college sports, courts have failed
to view the student-athlete and college relationship in terms of em-
ployer-employee. The courts, though, have debated in the past whether
48. See supra notes 30 & 31.
49. See supra notes 36 & 37.
50. See supra note 45. See also Whitlock v. University of Denver, 744 P.2d 54, 59 (Colo.
1987); Swanson v. Wabash College, 504 N.E.2d 327,330-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Van Mastrigt
v. Delta Tau Delta, 573 A.2d 1128, 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (university was not liable for
criminal acts occuring on campus involving a death at a fraternity party).
51. See SPERBER, supra note 8.
52. Id. Murray Sperber asserts that the NCAA functions as a trade association for college
coaches and athletic directors, implementing its wishes regardless of whether these are the
best interests of the member schools [and that] coaches who control the NCAA deny the
existence of any significant problems in college sports. Sarrm, supra note 5, at 166.
53. Id. at 345.
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a student-athlete should be defined as an employee in the context of
worker's compensation claims. The Colorado Supreme Court declared
in University of Denver v. Nemeth54 that a college football player fit the
statutory definition of an employee.5" The Court held that the student
attained a part-time job in consideration for his services and based its
decision on the foundation that "[h]igher education in this day is a busi-
ness, and a big one."'56 Yet, the Colorado Supreme Court reached the
opposite conclusion four years later in Compensation Insurance Fund v.
Industrial Accident Commission 7 and denied worker's compensation
benefits for an injury sustained by a scholarship athlete during a football
game.58 The Court here stated that the college could not be classified as
an employer because the college was not in the football business.5 9
While past cases have ruled for student-plaintiffs seeking worker's
compensation after suffering injuries while participating in college
sports, recent court cases suggest that athletes are not to be considered
employees covered under worker's compensation statutes since athletic
scholarships are not employment agreements. In the 1983 case Rensing
v. Indiana State University,60 the Indiana Supreme Court held that the
determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship fo-
cuses on whether there was an intent to create an express or implied
employment contract.61 The Court further stated that the scholarship
agreement in question was awarded based on past demonstrated talent
in order to enable students to pursue opportunities in higher education.
In other words, the scholarship was not intended as a commercial, em-
ployment contract. In the same year, a Michigan court in Coleman v.
West Michigan University6' concluded that student-athletes are not em-
ployees of the university.63 The court held that the university's primary
function is to provide students with an academic education and not to
"employ" athletes to fulfill their academic mission.ra
Due to the courts reluctance to view student-athletes as employees of
colleges, it seems that the professionalization of college athletics will be
54. 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953).
55. Id
56. lId at 424-26.
57. 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 290.
60. 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983).
61. IdM at 1173.
62. 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1953).
63. Id at 228.
64. Id. at 226.
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a difficult, long-term task. Such a process would involve a fundamental
re-evaluation of regulating college athletics by the NCAA.65 The courts
have clearly stated that amateurism will remain in place.
B. Distinction Between Student-Athletes and Private Students
The differences in the treatment of student-athletes and private stu-
dents by colleges justifies a heightened duty of care for student-athletes.
Private students can exercise greater personal autonomy at college. For
example, they are generally able to schedule their academic courses, se-
lect their own majors, and fully create their own social lives.
On the other hand, student-athletes are subjected to a greater degree
of control by colleges. Some athletic departments maintain strict control
over almost every aspect of certain student-athlete's college lives.66 For
instance, institutions will control student-athlete's decision-making to
the point where athletes do what they are told. Some will never look
over course decriptions or educational requirements. Rather, academic
courseloads and concentrations of study are determined by assistant
coaches in charge of academics. 67
On a social level, student-athletes are subjected to a degree of con-
trol by colleges regarding social functions. It is not an uncommon re-
quirement for student-athletes to engage in athletically-related social
activities, such as alumni and booster functions. 68 Coaches also exert
both control and influence over student-athletes' academic lives.69
This limited personal autonomy during college distinugishes the stu-
dent-athlete from the private student. A student-athlete participating in
a college sports program has a daily schedule far removed from that of a
private student. Student-athletes' lives in general are quite distinct - in
terms of classes, studying, and social functions - from the lives of pri-
vate students.
C. "Special Relationship" of Colleges and Student-Athletes
The college and student-athlete relationship should be legally recog-
nized as a special one, which imposes on colleges a heightened duty of
care when athletes suffer injury in the course of their participation in
65. Whang, supra note 12, at 38.
66. Davis, supra note 11, at 71.
67. PATRICIA ADLER & PETER ADLER, BACKBOARDS AND BLACKBOARDS: COLLEGE
ATHLETES AND ROLE ENGULFMENT 66-67 (1991).
68. Id. at 95.
69. See ALEXANDER WoFF & ARMEN KETEYiAN, RAw REcRUsTS 136 (1990).
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intercollegiate athletic programs. This heightened duty should be recog-
nized primarily because of the vast economic and non-economic benefits
that student-athletes generate for universities.
As stated earlier, common law tort principles dictate that there is no
duty to aid or protect another unless there exists a pre-existing special
relationship between the parties."° Although the Restatement (Second)
of Torts71 does not specifically identify the college and student-athlete
relationship as a special one, the Restatement (Second) of Torts does
allow for recognition of special relationships other than those specifically
listed in §314A.72 In order for a duty to arise, the risk of harm must
derive from the special relationship. 3 In addition, special relationships
are most often predicated upon the existence of mutual dependence
among the parties. 74 In fact, courts have reiterated that mutual depen-
dence between the parties is a pre-requisite of the recognition of special
relationships. 75
1. Mutual Dependency
The college and student-athlete relationship is special because it can
be characterized by mutual dependence. Colleges depend on student-
athletes for the economic and non-economic benefits that their partici-
pation in athletic programs generates for schools. Student-athletes de-
pend upon colleges for an education through athletic scholarships,
physical and mental training, and discipline.
a. College's Dependence on Student-Athletes
Colleges rely on student-athletes' participation in collegiate athletic
programs to generate economic benefits for their schools. 76 For exam-
ple, in 1988 Division I-A football generated $500 million in gate pro-
ceeds, television and licensing revenues, in addition to corporate sponsor
70. Supra note 41.
71. It must be recognized that the Restatement (Second) of Torts does not possess the
force of law, but only represents the suggested standard of law.
72. Supra note 44.
73. See supra note 41, at § 314A, cmt.c (stating that the duty to aid or protect applies
"only where the relation exists between the parties, and the risk of harm, or of further harm,
arises in the course of that relation").
74. IL at cmt.b.
75. See Whitlock v. University of Denver, 744 P.2d 54, 59-61 (Colo. 1987) (stating that
mutual dependence underlies the recognition of a duty of care involving special relationships);
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah 1986).
76. Supra note 8, at 254-56 (colleges depend on student-athletes to generate substantial
revenues from intercollegiate competition).
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and boosters contributions. 77 The University of Michigan's athletic de-
partment realized $18.5 million in 1989 revenues, $7.4 million from foot-
ball receipts alone.78 Corporate sponsorship of football bowl games has
increased dramatically from $400 million in 1984 to $2.5 billion in 1991. 79
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the NCAA could have negotiated a $1
billion contract with CBS to broadcast the Men's Basketball Tourna-
ment 0 if the NCAA could not rely on its member institutions generating
big dollars from the participation of its student-athletes.
In addition, colleges receive non-economic benefits from student-ath-
lete's participation in collegiate sports. Winning, successful athletic
teams are significant in building school enthusiasm for team support,
marketing the college and its athletic programs to prospective applicants,
bringing national media exposure to the college, and facilitating atletic
recruitment.8" The 1993 decision in Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College'
suggests that the non-economic benefits that student-athletes generate
for colleges was a key factor in the court's decision to recognize a special
relationship between the college and student-athlete in question.
b. Student-Athlete's Dependence on Colleges
Student-athletes depend on colleges and universities to provide an
environment in which they can earn an education. 3 Athletic scholar-
ships provide student-athletes access to educational opportunities.84
Athletic scholarship recipients must attain a level of athletic perform-
ance in exchange for the access to an education. As one commentator
stated about the student-athlete's one-year scholarship, "many coaches
in various sports have terminated grants to players or used the threat of
'firing' to induce better athletic performances, [t]hus the leverage that
one-year renewables give program heads over their players allows
77. Supra note 7, at 51.
78. Id. at 52.
79. See Catherine Yang, Bored by the Bowl Games? The IRS Wasn't, Bus. WK., Jan. 21,
1991, at 88.
80. Jones, supra note 1, at 154.
81. Erik Jensen, Taxation, the Student Athlete, and the Professionalization of College Ath-
letics, 1987 UTAH L. Rnv. 35, 44 & n.39 (explaining that the impact of a successful athletic
program can increase applications, alumni support and national exposure).
82. 989 F.2d 1360 (3rd Cir. 1993).
83. Barbara Lorence, Comment, The University's Role Toward Student-Athletes: A Moral
or Legal Obligation?, 29 Duo. L. Rv. 343, 353 (1991) (stating that special relationships are
most often exhibited by showing that one party is dependent on the other).
84. Davis, supra note 11, at 92.
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coaches to demand obedience not only on the field or in the gym but
also in the classroom.18 5
Furthermore, student-athletes also depend on colleges to provide the
opportunity to develop their athletic skills and prepare them for careers
as professional athletes.86 Universities provide a structured program for
student-athletes where they can develop their physical strength through
daily workouts and practice. Regular season games and post-season
tournaments further develop the student-athletes' physical stamina.
Furthermore, this kind of schedule develops their mental toughness and
builds discipline and character. Student-athletes rely on colleges to help
build these skills, not only for life in general, but for possible lifelong
athletic careers.
IV. UNIVERSrrIEs, STUDENT-ATHLETES AND A HEIGTENED DuTY
OF CARE
Under common law tort principles, the college and student-athlete
relationship can be characterized as a special one. This relationship in-
volves a mutual dependence, as discussed above, and control by colleges
over student-athletes' lives. A duty of care should be imposed on col-
leges for foreseeable injuries suffered in the course of a student-athlete's
participation in college sports programs. The important question then
becomes what is the proper scope of that duty.
Many cases in which courts have imposed a duty of reasonable care
for injuries occurring at school arising from the existence of a special
relationship have occurred at the pre-college level. The 1987 Indiana
Supreme Court case of Beckett v. Clinton Prairie School Corp.87 held
that high school employees owed a duty to exercise ordinary and reason-
able care regarding the health and safety of student-athletes under their
supervision.88 Due to the fact that high school students typically are mi-
nors and are not afforded the same degree of autonomy as college stu-
dents, this recognition of a duty of care based on a special relationship at
the high school level was found to be proper.
At the same time, a duty of care for foreseeable injuries suffered by
student-athletes should be equally applicable at the collegiate level.8 9
85. SPERBER, supra note 8, at 209.
86. PAUL WEELER & GARY ROBERTS, SPoRTS AND nm LAW 616 (1993) (declaring that
some athletes primarily look to the reputation of the athletic department or coach as an ave-
nue into the professional leagues).
87. 504 N.E2d 552 (Ind. 1987).
88. Id. at 553.
89. Whang, supra note 12, at 45-46.
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As discussed at length earlier, colleges receive both substantial economic
and non-economic benefits from student-athlete participation in inter-
collegiate athletic programs. 90 From a health standpoint, it is not equita-
ble for a college to reap these benefits from student-athletes without
having a duty to provide a reasonable level of care for those athletes.
An argument of unjust enrichment can be made where a heightened
duty of care should exist for student-athlete's foreseeable injuries since
colleges currently refuse to pay student-athletes to participate in college
athletics.
A. Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College
Some courts are beginning to recognize legal duties arising out of the
"special relationship" between colleges and student-athletes. The
Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College9' case focused directly on whether a
college owed a student-athlete a duty of care regarding injuries incurred
during participation in a school-sponsored sport for which the student-
athlete had been recruited. This case was the first to specifically address
the issue of whether a college owes its student-athletes a duty of reason-
able care based on the existence of a "special relationship. '
The plaintiff, Drew Kleinknecht, was a student-athlete recruited by
Gettysburg College to play intercollegiate lacrosse. While engaged in a
coach-supervised school lacrosse practice, the plaintiff suffered a heart
attack and subsequently died. He had no history of heart problems or
other unusual medical conditions.93 In a wrongful death suit filed by the
athlete's parents against the college, the district court granted summary
judgment for the college.94 The court held it was not foreseeable that
Kleinknecht, a student-athlete who seemed healthy, would suffer a heart
attack.95 Therefore, the college had no legal duty to guard against such
an event.96
The Third Circuit, however, reversed the district court's decision. It
held that Gettysburg College did owe a duty to the student-athlete,
90. Supra note 8, at 254-56 & supra note 81, at 44 & n.39.
91. 989 F.2d 1360 (3rd Cir. 1993).
92. Whang, supra note 12, at 46.
93. Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1365.
94. Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 786 F.Supp. 449 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
95. Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1365.
96. Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 786 F.Supp. at 454.
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based on the "special relationship"'97 between the two. 98 More specifi-
cally, the court held that the duty involved establishing preventive meas-
ures to provide treatment to student-athletes who need emergency
medical assistance.99 The court found that the occurrence of a life-
threatening injury during participation in an intercollegiate contact sport
was reasonably foreseeable. 100
The Kleinknecht court focused on two factors in recognizing a "spe-
cial relationship" between the college and the student-athlete. First, the
court found it significant that Drew Kleinknecht was actively recruited
by the school to participate on its collegiate lacrosse team.101 The court
declared that it was obvious that "the college recruited [Kleinknecht] for
its own benefit, probably thinking that his skill at lacrosse would bring
favorable attention and so aid the [c]ollege in attracting other stu-
dents.""° The court implied that a mutual dependence existed between
the college and Kleinknecht. Kleinknecht depended on the college for
further education and the opportunity to play intercollegiate sports, and
Gettysburg College depended on Kleinknecht to strengthen the reputa-
tion of the athletic department and the school. The Third Circuit real-
ized that a duty of care, namely to provide safeguards to ensure the
health of Kleinknecht, should be imposed on a school that utilizes a stu-
dent-athlete's talents to help generate further interest and recruitment in
the school.
The second factor the Kleinknecht court emphasized was that a duty
of care was owed by the college to Drew Kleinknecht because he was
acting in his capacity as an athlete when he collapsed, not in his capacity
as a private student. 10 3 The court declared that, at the time he collapsed,
97. The Third Circuit's conclusion that there was a "special relationship" between Gettys-
burg College and Kleinknecht was based on an earlier decision in Hanson v. Kynast, No. CA-
828 (Ohio Ct. App. June 3, 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 494 N.E.2d 1091 (1986). In Hanson,
an intercollegiate lacrosse player was severely injured while competing in a intercollegiate
match. The injured athlete sued the college for breach of its duty to have an ambulance pres-
ent during the game. The trial court granted summary judgment for the college, but the court
of appeals reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court.
The Third Circuit in the Kleinknecht case found that because the court of appeals in Han-
son remanded the case back to the trial court for further findings of fact, the "court of appeals
[in Hanson] implicitly held that the university owed a duty of care to the plaintiff." Hanson,
No. CA-828 at 6.
98. Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1367.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1369.
101. Id at 1367.
102. Id. at 1368.
103. Id
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"[the plaintiff] was not engaged in his own private affairs as a student at
Gettysburg College. Instead, he was participating for an intercollegiate
team sponsored by the College under the supervision of College employ-
ees.110 4 The court, therefore, made the significant distinction between
students injured during their involvement in intercollegiate sports, and
students injured while pursuing their private interests. 10 5
The Kleinknecht court recognized a duty of care in favor of student-
athletes participating in intercollegiate athletic programs, but a limited
duty of care. The first limitation is that the duty of care exists only for
injuries suffered by student-athletes during participation in the sport for
which they were recruited.10 6 The second limitation is that a duty can
only be imposed on the university if the injury is reasonably foreseeable.
The court declared that a legal duty exists when the risk of harm is both
foreseeable and unreasonable.0 7 Thus, a college only owes a duty of
care to a limited number of students. 08
B. Knapp v. Northwestern University
The issue of a legal duty of colleges to protect student-athletes from
injury continues to be debated. The issue is a broad one because it in-
volves many questions, including whether a student-athlete has the right
to play intercollegiate sports with a significant, possibly life-threatening
health risk. Following the highly publicized death of Loyola Marymount
basketball star Hank Gathers, 09 universities and courts have wrestled
back and forth over the dilemma. Should student-athletes legally be al-
lowed to make their own decisions about playing with a known health-
104. Ie. at 1367.
105. Id. at 1368.
106. Id.
107. Id at 1369.
108. The court implied that a student-athlete who suffers a cardiac arrest, for example,
during a fraternity football game or intramural game is not owed the heightened duty of care
as an athlete in Kleinknecht's situation is owed.
109. Hank Gathers played for Loyola Marymount College and was a star college basket-
ball player. In 1990, while playing a West Coast Conference tournament game, Gather's col-
lapsed on the court and went into cardiac arrest. Unable to revive his heart on the court,
doctors tried to stimulate his heart with electric shock. Gathers was pronounced dead one
hour and forty-one minutes after his collapse.
Gathers had collapsed before during a Loyola basketball game. He had a condition known
as cardiac arrhythmia (or irregular heartbeat), but he continued to play and Loyola's athletic
department cleared him to do so after consulting several physicians about the situation. Bar-
bara Lorence, The University's Role Toward Student-Athletes: A Moral or Legal Obligation?,
29 DuQ. L. Rnv. 343 (1991).
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risk? Or can universities exercise their duty of care and stop a student-
athlete with a significant health risk from playing intercollegiate sports?
The 1996 case Knapp v. Northwestern University'1 illustrates that
universities can exercise their duty of care and stop a student with a sig-
nificant health risk from playing intercollegiate sports. Like the
Kleinknecht case, this case also involved a student specifically recruited
to play intercollegiate sports. Nicholas Knapp is a Northwestern Univer-
sity sophomore"' who was recruited to play basketball at the university
(he was recruited at the end of his junior year of high school" 2 ). How-
ever, at the beginning of his senior year of high school, Knapp suffered
cardiac arrest while playing a pick-up basketball game.1 3 He was re-
vived by paramedics and subsequently had a cardioverter-defibrillator
implanted in his body to prevent future attacks.1 4
After Knapp suffered his cardiac arrest, Northwestern informed him
that, whatever the ultimate medical decision, it would honor its commit-
ment and still offer him a scholarship." 5 Yet, about two months after
enrolling at the university, Northwestern's head team physician declared
Knapp ineligible to participate on Northwestern's men's basketball team
for the 1995-96 school year." 6 After the 1995-96 basketball season
ended, Northwestern and the Big Ten Conference declared Knapp per-
manently ineligible to play intercollegiate basketball at Northwestern
due to his medical condition." 7
In a subsequent suit filed by Knapp against the university, a federal
district court found Knapp medically eligible to play intercollegiate bas-
ketball at Northwestern." 8 Northwestern's motion for summary judg-
ment was denied and the court held that intercollegiate basketball was a
"major life activity" under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.119 The district court further stated that the university unfairly de-
110. 1996 WL 676190 (7th Cir. (Ill.)).
111. Id at 1.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. A cardioverter-defibrillator is a device that detects heart arrhythmia and it deliv-
ers a shock to convert an abnormal heart rhythm back to normal. In other woids, if Knapp's
heart stops again, the device is designed to re-start it. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. Northwestern's athletic director, Rick Taylor, later confirmed that Northwestern
University will never voluntarily let Nicholas Knapp play intercollegiate basketball as a Wild-
cat (as a member of the team). Id.
118. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 938 F.Supp. 508 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
119. Id. at 510. Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 protects "othervdse qual-
ified individuals" from discrimination on account of disability. The purpose of the Act is to
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nied Knapp because he was "otherwise qualified" to play intercollegiate
basketball at Northwestern. 120
The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed the district court's decision
and remanded the case."' The Court declared that Knapp was not
"otherwise qualified" to play intercollegiate basketball at Northwest-
ern.12 The Court stated that Knapp was not "disabled" under the
meaning of the Rehabilition Act because "playing intercollegiate basket-
ball.., is not in and of itself a major life activity." ' 3 The Seventh Cir-
cuit declared that Knapp was not discriminated against when declared
ineligible to play intercollegiate basketball by Northwestern.
Regarding a college's duty of care to its student-athletes, the Seventh
Circuit discusses the existence of an implied duty of care imposed on
Northwestern University. The Seventh Circuit Judge Terence Evans
stated that the issue of Knapp's eligibility to play intercollegiate basket-
ball was not a decision for the courts, but an issue for the university to
decide:
The district court judge in this case believed that.., the decision
on whether Knapp should play falls in the lap of the court... We
disagree with the district court's legal determination that such de-
cisions are to be made by the courts and believe instead that med..
ical determinations of this sort are best left to team doctors and
universities as long as they are made with reason and rationality
and with full regard to possible and reasonable accomodations.124
provide an even handed treatment of qualified disabled persons and to prevent discrimination
based on a perceived inability to function in a particular context. For a prima facie case under
the Act, one must demonstrate that (1) he/she is "disabled" under the meaning of the Act, (2)
he/she is "otherwise qualifed" for the position sought, (3) he/she is excluded from the position
solely because of the disability, and (4) the position from which he/she is excluded is part of a
federally funded program. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504(a) (1973), as amended 29
U.S.C.A. § 794 (1992).
120. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 938 F.Supp. at 511.
121. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 1996 WL 676190 (7th Cir. (Ill.)).
122. Id at 7. Knapp contended that playing intercollegiate basketball was an integral part
of the "major life activity" of learning and if not allowed to play, Northwestern would be
"substantially limiting" his education. Id at 4. However, the Seventh Circuit stated that
"[p]laying intercollegiate basketball obviously is not in and of itself a major life activity, as it is
not a basic function of life on the same level as walking, breathing, and speaking. Not every-
one gets to go to college, let alone play intercollegiate sports." Id. at 5. The court further
stated that "[b]ecause learning through playing intercollegiate basketball is only one part of
the education available to Knapp at Northwestern, even under a subjective standard, Knapp's
ability to learn is not substantially limited.. .[t]he fact that Knapp's goal of playing intercolle-
giate basketball is frustrated does not substantially limit his education." Id at 7.
123. Id at 5. See supra note 122.
124. Id. at 10.
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By reversing the district court and allowing Northwestern to make the
ultimate decision on Knapp's eligbility, the Seventh Circuit stated, in ef-
fect, that colleges and universities can exercise a duty of care and protect
their student-athletes against foreseeable injuries. 125 The Knapp court
implicitly recognizes that a "special relationship" exists between the stu-
dent-athlete and the university.126 By stating that "the university has the
right to determine that an individual is not otherwise qualified to
play,"'2 7 the court recognizes, as the Kleinknecht court did, that North-
western and colleges in general have a duty to protect their student ath-
letes for the sport in which they were recruited and when the severity of
the potential injury is high.'2 s At the same time, the Seventh Circuit is
declaring that student-athletes can not easily waive this duty of care. In
fact, Nicholas Knapp and his parents were willing to sign a liability
waiver, which could have absolved Northwestern University should
Knapp have suffered death. 29 While not couched in the same language
of the Kleinknecht case, the decision in Knapp supports the legal recog-
nition of a duty of care owed to student-athletes by colleges based on the
"special relationship" between the two.
125. Despite conflicting expert testimony from Knapp's experts, Northwestern's experts
agreed with the school's team doctors that Knapp's participation in competitive Big Ten bas-
ketball presented an unacceptable level of risk. According to Dr. Maron, one of Northwest-
ern's experts, the most important fact in assessing Knapp's current risk of sudden cardiac
death while playing intercollegiate basketball was the fact that his previous sudden cardiac
death was induced by playing basketball. Id. at 9.
126. The Kleinknecht court emphasized two factors in recognizing a "special relationship"
existing between the college and student-athlete: (1) the college actively recruited the stu-
dent-athlete, and therefore intended to benefit from his participation in intercollegiate sports,
and (2) the relationship stems from the fact that the student-athlete is participating in his
capacity as an athlete, not as a private student.
Here, in the Knapp case, a "special relationship" exists because Knapp was actively re-
cruited by Northwestern. Id at 1. Furthermore, Northwestern disqualified Knapp from play-
ing on its intercollegiate team, and does not restrict him from playing pick-up basketball or
using the recreational facilities on campus or physically exerting himself as a private student.
Id. at 1.
127. Id
128. See supra part IV.A.
129. After the Hank Gather's incident, it is unlikely that courts in the near future will
bootstrap universities and force them to allow a high-risk, significantly health-impaired stu-
dent-athlete to play intercollegiate sports, particularly a top athlete who was recruited. If
courts do force the issue, not only is the risk of harm great for the health-impaired student-
athlete, but universities then must live with the potential of the worst-case scenerio happening
- the student-athlete dying during a game - which would most likely hurt the university's
reputation, garner bad press, and inevitably hurt future recruiting.
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V. CONCLUSION
Both the Kleinknecht case and the recent decision in Knapp demon-
strate that the courts are beginning to understand that collegiate student-
athletes are owed a heightened duty of care by colleges and universities.
Yet, as college student-athletes continue to play a significant role in gen-
erating more and more economic and non-economic benefits for college
athletic programs, the nature of the college and student-athlete relation-
ship will remain amorphous and not fully defined in terms of colleges
"owe" student-athletes.
Given the entrenched system of amateurism that continues to frame
college athletics today, student-athletes' relationship with colleges must
change if colleges continue to refuse to compensate athletes financially.
A heightened duty of care for foreseeable injuries suffered in the course
of student-athletes' participation in intercollegiate sports programs must
be consistently recognized. If courts follow the lead of the Kleinknecht
and Knapp decisions, student-athletes will be afforded more complete
protection from the institutions who already receive so much from stu-
dent-athletes' involvement in intercollegiate college sports.
ANDREW RHIM
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